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THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN HOMELAND SECURITY
The sudden and unexpected terrorist events which occurred in New York City, Washington, D.C., and over the skies of Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001 , changed many aspects in our lives, especially the renewed focus on protection of the homeland and the safety of its citizenry. Since the Civil War, threats of war were predominately considered to be outside the boundaries of the United States. The nation was isolated by two oceans and bracketed by peaceful neighbors, both north and south. Feeling a sense of internal national security from foreign hostilities, focus was directed towards a threat taking place outside the borders.
Impending terrorist threats by foreign adversaries, directed towards U.S. citizens and high value infrastructure targets, have resulted in the homeland now as a theater of war. 1 As a result of these actions, future warfight contingencies should now include plans for homeland security scenarios, utilizing reserve component (RC) forces, specifically the National Guard, within the mix of force.
Throughout the last few years, numerous studies have been conducted to research the organization, roles, and missions for the RC. Efforts to define these have accelerated since homeland security (HLS) became the number one priority after 9/11, however much controversy still exists.
This paper begins with the evolving history of the RC organization and utilization for HLS missions as well as its support to the active component (AC) in overseas combat contingency missions, from the early beginnings of the nation to modern day military operations. Existing legal statutes and current force structure associated with the utilization and organization of both RC and AC forces are covered. Suggestions are presented to modify existing legal statutes, role definitions, and the current AC/RC organizational mix of force to better meet the ever changing military missions around the globe as well as within the state and nation. Finally, reactivation of the State Defense Force (SDF) concept is offered as a major militia contributor and force provider to assist the National Guard in its HLS role.
RESERVE COMPONENT HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
In early colonial days, no standing army existed so the colonists established a volunteer militia system modeled after a similar system utilized in England before it had its own standing army. The main purpose of this American territory militia force was to provide homeland defense. 2 Used as an on-call volunteer force, it was primarily used in a defensive posture but later did initiate some offensive raids against hostile Indian tribes as well as against some settlements of European nations who forced their will on the colonists. "In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defense of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States … shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so needed." 4 The increase in active duty missions does not diminish the fact that the Guard still provides support to the governors for state emergency missions as well as for HLS missions.
This dual federal/state mission is unique to the National Guard since the other reserve forces only have a federal mission.
HOMELAND SECURITY DEFINITION
Although HLS is not a new phenomenon for the military and nation, not all sources and organizations are in complete agreement on its specific definition. Most agree that HLS is more a preventative measure against terrorism, whereas consequence management is the term used for those actions taken after the terrorist action or disaster has occurred. Guard forces can also be brought on duty under Title 32 but in SAD status, normally as a result of a call-up by the Governor in response to emergencies and disasters within the state.
Under SAD, the Governor retains command and control and the state assumes liability for any claims associated with the duty.
The ability to provide Guard forces under Title 32, either federally funded or in SAD status, provides a quick responsive contingency of trained and resourced support to first responders for local or regional emergencies. It is advantageous to provide activated Guard forces in either SAD or federally funded Title 32 status to support local disasters or emergencies within the state. First, Guard forces are perceived as local citizens of the community or state and are more readily accepted by the local populace to assist first responders. Second, the assignment of decentralized individual soldiers or small contingencies of forces or units with other agencies to assist first responders is often times more agreeable for National Guard leadership than active duty leadership. Third, many of the activated Guard members are employees of the various agencies supported during period of activations. These Guard members blend their experience and knowledge of both their own civilian agencies as well as that of the military to better accomplish the emergency or disaster mission. The interagency process is benefited as a result of this unique duality citizen soldier construct.
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PRIOR TO 9/11
A few years before the 9/11 disaster, an effort to increase the role of the RC forces in HLS resulted out of an attempt to resolve controversy over proposed RC strength reductions. The
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified military requirements after the breakup of
the Soviet Union which also ended the Cold War. 9 Identified in the QDR were drastic strength cuts for all four service components of the RC forces, with the heaviest reduction in relative terms within the Army. 10 The proposed force reductions created debate over the RC relevancy and leadership. perform both missions is restrictive and, additionally, to have both mission assignments might distract from the readiness perspective for the combat contingency missions. 13 Readiness levels for both missions may be impaired by this dual mission requirement since units may not be able to concentrate adequately on either one.
The leadership of the RC forces as well as the Army and Air Force was not convinced that funding would follow the assignment of an additional mission. In the past, funding for RC forces usually was prioritized for the high priority combat units and not for combat service and combat service support units. They were skeptical that funding would be adequately addressed for missions other that combat.
The Commission on National Security/21 st Century Report (Hart-Rudman Commission) is another study that discusses HLS missions. 14 It consists of reports in three separate phases which addresses the vulnerability of the nation to weapons of mass destruction. The Phase III Report describes its determination of the National Guard's role in HLS. According to its recommendation, the Secretary of Defense should designate that a primary mission of the National Guard should be HLS, however, in order to fulfill this mission the Guard needs to be appropriately resourced, organized, and trained to be successful. 15 Obviously, some resources currently used to support the AC for wartime missions would need to be redirected to activities commensurate with HLS and military support to civilian authorities.
Since the release of the Phase III Report, much discussion has taken place over the primary mission for the Guard. Some have interpreted this to mean that HLS is the primary mission rather than a primary mission for the Guard. This issue was clarified by Warren Rudman himself, with the following statement:
"One of our recommendations that has been vastly misunderstood is, we talk about forward deployment of U.S. forces, the United States National Guard is forward deployed in this country, and in the event of the kind of Holocaust we're talking about, they are the best people to aid local authorities in their states as they do now. Some of them have thought we were recommending, who didn't read the report, that that be their primary mission. We say it should be a secondary mission. Their primary mission is the one to support the regular forces in time of national emergency, particularly in times of war." 16 Rudman's statement is echoed by the feelings of most of the Guard's senior leadership.
The Guard's position is that restructuring the force is overdue, however, the Total Force concept is still valid and the Guard should be included in both wartime contingencies as well as HLS missions.
AFTER 9/11
A new unified combatant command, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), was established after 9/11 with the responsibility for homeland defense and military support to Bureau to supply and train the force, primarily in support of overseas combat missions for the combatant commanders. To better prepare for federal HLS missions, funding will need to be supplied to adequately equip and train the force before missions are assigned. In the past, the Guard has acquired funding for training, operations, maintenance, equipment, and programs from Congress, but it has not been real successful in obtaining the funding support from combatant commanders. Since NORTHCOM is now responsible for HLS and the Guard seems to be the military force of choice for HLS, it would seem feasible that the Guard may now have a advocate to seek needed HLS funds which will help the Guard with this asymmetric threat.
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Another resource problem associated with this issue concerns the right mix of force structure currently residing within the Guard. Since there has been a close association with Active forces now heavily rely upon RC units, both Guard and Reserve, to provide needed combat, combat support, and combat service units to their force structure when deployed to conduct combat missions. Most force structure which exists in the Guard today was established to provide combat units to supplement the AC for wartime contingencies with over 54% of the Army's combat structure residing within the Guard. 21 Because the Guard has become the force of choice for this mission, consideration for more combat support and combat service support will be reviewed and then planned for the Guard in support of this asymmetrical threat. With the renewed interest in HLS since 9/11, this pattern of building up combat structure in the Guard is beginning to change. 22 Consequently, force structure changes made within the Guard would necessitate force structure changes within the active forces. In order to take on the HLS as a major role for the Guard, the AC force must be re-structured for major contingencies in order to be less dependent upon the Guard forces who may be needed for catastrophic attacks and emergencies at home. 23 This will require a realignment of the forces so that the AC forces absorb the combat, combat service and combat service support units lost by the Guard force structure realignment.
Some progress to restructure the Guard forces to be more appropriately aligned with HLS missions has been realized. Some states began to convert some combat structure to combat support and combat service support during the first two phases of the Army Division Redesign Study (ADRS). 24 Additionally, the Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative identified the conversion of some mechanized and armored brigades to be converted to wheeled Mobile Light
Brigades. This structure is more versatile for many missions, ranging from HLS to major combat conflicts. 25 In the fall of 2003, the announcement was made that some of the current artillery battalions in the Guard will be converted to military police structure, needed both by the Guard for HLS missions as well as for the AC in combat, peacekeeping missions, and homeland defense missions. Some engineer and chemical structure conversions are also planned in the future.
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Even though the primary mission of the Guard is to supplement the AC for national security missions, it still must be able to respond to its other local role within the state during times of emergencies at the direction of the Governor. During recent years, the Guard has been ordered to active deployment in increased numbers and for extended periods of time. 27 This has primarily been a result of active force strength reductions of 34% coupled with a 300% in mission rates during the last decade. 28 Most recently, many RC units on active duty were informed that their tour of duty will be extended. This surely will impact significantly on recruiting and retention within the Guard, but is too early to gather many statistics.
The Guard has been stretched thin during the last few years with numerous deployments as well as state missions in response to local catastrophic events. The debate remains as to what role the Guard can play and be able to sustain before retention problems heavily impact readiness levels and mission effectiveness. Current force structure levels in the Guard are not sufficient to adequately perform continuous deployments, state domestic emergency missions, and HLS missions.
RECOMMENDATIONS/ALTERNATIVES
Can the Guard continually maintain a high level of operational readiness for wartime conflicts as well as being trained and ready for HLS missions whenever they arise within the A second alternative would be to eliminate any requirement for HLS missions for the Guard. The Guard would maintain the other two missions of state emergencies and assist AC forces in combat missions. This alternative is the least disruptive for the military as it maintains the current structure and mission assignment capability. It does not, however, address how HLS missions will be met. Under this alternative, local state civilian forces would have to accept the missions through federal funding mandates. The ability for states to adequately meet the personnel, training, and fiscal requirements for this scenario would be highly suspect. Most states have experienced severe budgetary deficits in recent years and this option would not seem achievable.
A third alternative would be to vastly increase Guard force structure with appropriate units and troop strength so that state needs as well as federal needs can be met. Both federal and state missions could be accomplished since additional forces would make that a reality. Budget restrictions and additional recruiting challenges, however, would impede the progress of this alternative and not make this option seem easily attainable. Today, attempts are being made to realign both the AC and RC forces so that the AC can become less reliant upon the RC and the RC will be better adept to respond to HLS missions.
These actions are taking place while the Total Force posture remains constant with the RC maintaining a relevant force to supplement the AC for combat contingencies.
STATE DEFENSE FORCES TO SUPPLEMENT THE NATIONAL GUARD
Another way to approach the HLS mission, rather than to simply increase or drastically restructure either or both the RC and/or AC, is to re-institutionalize the State militia construct.
Different and much less expensive to establish and maintain than the National Guard or Reserves, these militia forces have been described with various titles throughout their history. 32 It is highly likely that many of the Guard forces may be occupied in support of the AC forces overseas when a HLS event occurs here at home. They may not be within their home state when needed for HLS. As a result, it is extremely important that NORTHCOM is familiar with the roles and capabilities of the SDF to ensure proper contingency and consequence management. 33 The Rudman Commission stated that forces assigned to HLS missions need specialized training. The National Guard is the main force to provide NORTHCOM with trained soldiers and airmen to fulfill the HLS mission requirements, however, most of them are trained for combat type missions, and may also be mobilized overseas and unavailable when needed here at home. 34 The SDFs help to fill this void since they do not have a federal warfight mission to send them out of the state and country, and many are trained and certified by the Federal Emergency Although the SDF structure seems to be an important force in response to HLS situations and fills an important void during times when the Guard is mobilized for overseas missions, it
has not been met with enthusiasm by the senior leadership of National Guard. Much of this non-acceptance by the National Guard Bureau and some Adjutants General are due to political rather than mission capable rationale. Political turf battles mainly occurred when of some senior SDF generals were appointed as lieutenant generals and wore one more star the Guard's Adjutant Generals, as well as when SDFs actually assumed the role as the State's military force and competed with the "real" Guard. These petty issues should not be a major reason to abandon the SDF program. 36 The construct has worked well for many states and more recently seems to be an efficient way to provide a trained force for consequence management without providing huge sums of federal funds to vastly restructure the AC and RC forces.
CONCLUSION
This paper addresses some of the issues commensurate with the Total Force Policy as it affects the HLS mission and describes an alternative force that can be used to provide trained personnel to assist and sometimes replace the National Guard in this mission. These issues include force structure realignment with relevant units, WMD-CST integration, Total Force continuation, dual missioning, HLS funding, and SDF integration. The CSTs provide a much needed force of highly talented and trained group of full time personnel within the Guard to provide support to chemical, biological, and radiological threats.
Only 32 of these teams currently exist with 12 more identified for future funding. The remaining teams need to be funded so that all states can field a team.
The Total Force Policy has been politically successful by keeping relevant units in the RC which are needed by the AC when preparing for major combat operations. Force structure kept in the RC that is only needed for major operations reduces the operational costs of the AC but ensures their availability when needed.
The dual missioning concept is working and can remain in effect even with the addition of the HLS mission if WMD-CSTs are fully fielded, certain HLS type units and MOS's are realigned within the Guard, and the SDF is implemented in more states. Some specific units and the CSTs may need to be identified only for HLS missions, especially within states that have high value targets.
Guard units valued by the AC as high priority units have historically received a higher level of resources than lesser relevant units. This type of emphasis on funding needs to be applied to units which are recognized as those needed for HLS missions.
The SDF construct should be integrated into states that have local resources to support the force. These teams provide trained personnel to counter terrorist threats and provide support for HLS missions. They also do not have a wartime mission so they will be available to the governor and Adjutant General even if the Guard units within the state are mobilized.
Meeting the challenge of HLS is not new for the National Guard, although the enemy now poses a much different asymmetrical threat unlike any adversary in history. Being able to respond quickly to a local terrorist threat or incident, the Guard is, and will remain, the state and federal force of choice for governors and the President. To meet this threat, the Guard seems to be the force most appropriately and legally aligned, trained, and available to quickly respond.
The Total Force Policy has transformed the AC and RC forces so that the AC is now reliant upon the RC forces during any major conflict for additional support, especially combat and combat service support units. The National Guard in each state continually strives to obtain relevant units that meet the local recruiting demographics as well as the needs of the AC warfight. Relevant RC units are funded at a higher level than those units that are in less demand for AC combat missions. The Total Force Policy thus seems to be politically and functionally successful and will continue to function in the future. However, because of its dual missioning responsibilities, the Guard may not always be available when needed for the HLS contingency.
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